The discovery module defines the seam: DiscoveryProvider (subscribe/ announce over 32-byte TopicKeys) and a signed Announcement carrying root hash, ed25519 author, metadata and provider addresses. Signatures cover a deterministic postcard encoding including the topic (no cross- channel replay) and the provider identities (addresses stay refreshable hints). LanDiscovery conforms to the trait — mdns sightings become locally-authored announcements, one per pinned root — and the daemon's auto-sync now runs entirely through it: verify, index unconditionally, fetch only for trusted authors from allowlisted providers on already- pinned incomplete roots. The milestone-4 real-mdns sync test passes unchanged through the new path. Verification unit tests cover round trip, tampered root, wrong topic, forged author, mismatched signing key, and serde survival. docs/redoal-integration.md sketches the gesture-topic gossip provider against this contract. Also: fix a flaky hang in the socket-activation test (dup2(3,3) leaves CLOEXEC set when the listener already sits on fd 3; parent's listener copy masked daemon death), and give the test client a read-timeout hang guard. Add a top-level README. Dependencies: ed25519-dalek (Signature type; same implementation iroh keys use), postcard (deterministic signed encoding, iroh's canonical compact codec). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
3.8 KiB
redoal integration sketch
How a gesture-derived discovery provider plugs into varde without touching the daemon. Nothing here is implemented; this documents the contract the v1 seam already enforces.
The seam
varde_daemon::discovery defines:
pub trait DiscoveryProvider: Send + Sync {
fn subscribe(&self, topic: TopicKey) -> BoxStream<SignedAnnouncement>;
fn announce(&self, topic: TopicKey, ann: SignedAnnouncement) -> Result<()>;
}
TopicKeyis an opaque 32-byte channel id.Announcement { root, author, meta, providers }is signed (ed25519, the same key type as iroh NodeIds) over a deterministic postcard encoding that includes the topic, so announcements can't be replayed across channels. Provider socket addresses are excluded from the signature (relays may refresh them); provider identities are covered.
The daemon consumes any provider identically (Daemon::on_announcement):
- verify the signature — drop on failure;
- index the announcement (all of them — discovery is the open tier);
- auto-fetch only when all of these hold:
- the author key is trusted (or is the local daemon),
- the root is already pinned locally and incomplete,
- at least one announced provider is on the peer allowlist.
v1 ships one implementation, LanDiscovery: mDNS sightings are turned
into locally-authored announcements ("peer N may hold pinned root R").
It proves the seam because the daemon's entire auto-sync path runs
through subscribe() — swap the provider and nothing above changes.
The redoal provider (future)
redoal turns a shared physical gesture (two phones shaken together, a tap pattern, ...) into a high-entropy shared secret between the people present. That secret derives a gossip topic:
TopicKey = BLAKE3-derive_key("redoal/v1/topic", gesture_secret)
RedoalDiscovery would:
- join the iroh-gossip swarm for that TopicId (iroh-gossip rides the same iroh endpoint varde already has — no new transport);
subscribe(topic): yield gossip messages decoded asSignedAnnouncements. Verification and consent stay in the daemon — the provider is a dumb pipe by design;announce(topic, ann): broadcast to the swarm. Unlike the LAN provider (where announce is a no-op because mDNS already advertises presence), gossip announce actively publishes — the daemon must only call it for content the user shared to that topic.
Trust bootstrap
The gesture is the consent ceremony. Deriving from the same secret:
author trust: the gesture exchange includes both parties' public keys
(signed with the gesture key), so each side adds the
other to the *author* allowlist for that topic.
peer trust: announcements carry provider NodeIds; on a gestured
topic, providers named by a trusted author get scoped
peer trust (serve/fetch for that topic's roots only).
That last point needs one extension to the v1 model: today peer trust
is global (meta.json allowlist). Topic-scoped trust would add
trusted_for: {topic → keys}, checked in the same two places the
global list is checked now (provider accept gate, fetch candidate
filter). The seam anticipates this: both checks already live in the
daemon, not in the provider.
What stays true regardless of provider
- Discovery open, replication explicit: indexing an announcement never moves bytes; only the trust checks above do.
- All fetched data is BLAKE3-verified by iroh-blobs.
- Metered/rate-limit posture applies unchanged — providers sit above the transport, the limiters below it.
Sizing
RedoalDiscovery is roughly: iroh-gossip dependency, ~200 lines of
provider glue, the topic-scoped trust extension in meta.json, and a
varde-ctl topic join <secret> command. No daemon architecture changes.